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Authoritative: http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.1993.1030   (Publisher's PDF... likely be available here.)

CiteSeer: http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/context/206682/0

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Abstract

Asymmetric information games where the informed player can send a costless message (sender–receiver games) typically have equilibria where meaningful communication occurs. We therefore know such `cheap talk' can matter. Still, even when there is no conflict of interest, there are also equilibria where no information transmission occurs. This paper shows that for a class of games with perfectly coinciding interests modeled as asymmetric contests, where players are unsure of which role they will have, only meaningful communication is evolutionarily stable.

@article{warneryd93cheapTalk,
  author={Karl Warneryd},
  title={Cheap talk, coordination, and evolutionary stability},
  journal={Games and Economic Behavior},
  year={1993},
  volume={5},
  number={4},
  pages={532-546},
  doi={10.1006/game.1993.1030},
  url={http://www.isrl.uiuc.edu/~amag/langev/paper/warneryd93cheapTalk.html}
}