Jason Noble - 1998 - Evolved Signals: Expensive Hype vs. Conspirational Whispers

Noble, J. (1998) Evolved Signals: Expensive Hype vs. Conspirational Whispers. In C. Adami and R. Belew and H. Kitano and C. Taylor, editors, Artificial Life VI, pages 358--67. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press..

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Paper at a Glance

Evolved Signals: Expensive Hype vs. Conspiratorial Whispers
Jason Noble
School of Cognitive and Computing Sciences
University of Sussex
Brighton BN1 9QH, U.K.
jasonn@cogs.susx.ac.uk
Abstract Artificial life models of the evolution of communica tion have usually assumed either cooperative or com petitive contexts. This paper presents a general model that covers signalling with and without conflicts of interest between signallers and receivers. Krebs & Dawkins (1984) argued that a conflict of interests will lead to an evolutionary arms race between ma nipulative signallers and sceptical receivers, resulting in ever more costly signals; whereas common inter ests will lead to cheap signals or ``conspiratorial whis pers''. Simple gametheoretic and evolutionary simu lation models suggest that signalling will evolve only if it is in the interests of both parties. In a model where signallers may inform receivers as to the value of a binary random variable, if signalling is favoured at all, then signallers will always use the cheapest and the secondcheapest signal available. Costly sig nalling arms races do not get started. A more com plex evolutionary simulation was constructed, featur ing continuously variable signal strengths and recep tion thresholds. As the congruence of interests be tween the parties became more clearcut, the evolu tion of successively cheaper signals was observed. The findings are taken to support a modified version of Krebs & Dawkins's argument. Artificial life models of communication Artificial life (AL) models of the evolution of communi cation are often constructed such that honest signalling is in the interests of both signallers and receivers---any communication systems that evolve can therefore be described as cooperative. For example, Werner & Dyer (1992) postulated blind, mobile males and sighted, im mobile females: the evolution of a signalling system was in the interests of both parties as it allowed mat ing to take place ...

BibTex

@inproceedings{noble98evolvedSignals,
  author={J. Noble},
  title={Evolved Signals: Expensive Hype vs. Conspirational Whispers},
  year={1998},
  pages={358-67},
  address={Cambridge, MA},
  editor={C. Adami and R. Belew and H. Kitano and C. Taylor},
  publisher={MIT Press.},
  booktitle={Artificial Life VI},
  url={http://www.isrl.uiuc.edu/~amag/langev/paper/noble98evolvedSignals.html}
}

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