HOME   ::  Conference List   ::   Conference Paper
Noble, J. (2000) Talk is cheap: Evolved strategies for communication and action in asymmetrical animal contests. In J.-A. Meyer and A. Berthoz and D. Floreano and H. Roitblat and S. Wilson, editors, SAB00, pages 481--490. Honolulu, Hawaii: MIT Press.
Bookmark:  

Full-text
   URL: http://www-abc.mpib-berlin.mpg.de/users/...ession/sab2000.ps.gz
   Cached: PDF-209K    PS-368K    PS.gz-87K   
   SAVE AS an easy-to-recall long filename:
      Filename format: author--year--title   PDF-209K    PS-87K    :: About GZip'd PS
      Filename format: author--year--title--journal|proceedings|...--pages   PDF-209K    PS-87K   

Related links
   CiteSeer: http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/323614.html
  Web search: Google Web Search   ::   Google Scholar
  Within this site: Cited by (2)    References (30)

Paper at a Glance 

Talk is cheap: Evolved strategies for communication
and action in asymmetrical animal contests
Jason Noble
Center for Adaptive Behavior and Cognition
Max Planck Institute for Human Development
Lentzeallee 94, D­14195 Berlin, Germany
noble@mpib­berlin.mpg.de
Abstract Animal contests over resources are often settled by displays rather than fighting. Contests may involve asymmetries that cannot be perceived, such as unequal fighting ability. Classical game­ theoretic accounts suggest that talk is cheap, and that honest signals conveying information about an asymmetry should not be expected. A model by Enquist (1985) reaches the opposite conclu­ sion, and predicts reliable, cost­free signalling of fighting ability. An evolutionary simulation is presented which tests Enquist's assumption that weak animals will signal honestly because they have so much to lose by bluffing. The status of Enquist's honest signalling strategy as an ESS is questioned, and his conclusions are shown to be dependent on an idiosyncratic way of modelling animal combat.
1. Introduction In acquiring the resources necessary for survival and re­ production, animals often come into conflict with one another. For example, funnel­web spiders compete for feeding territories (Riechert, 1987), elephants get into disputes over mating opportunities (Poole, 1989), and rival honeybee queens battle for control of a colony (Wil­ son, 1971). Sometimes these contests consist of a fight to the death, or at least to the serious injury, as in the case of the honeybees. However, much of the time, and across many species, contests stop short of violence and are settled by what appear to be threat displays, signals of strength or aggressive intent, and conventions such as ``territory owner always wins.'' Why should this be? Ethologists used to believe that the avoidance of fighting in favour of display behaviour served to benefit the species---contests could be settled without the high fitness costs of violent ...
BibTex
@inproceedings{noble00talkIs,
  author={J. Noble},
  title={Talk is cheap: Evolved strategies for communication and action in asymmetrical animal contests},
  year={2000},
  pages={481-490},
  address={Honolulu, Hawaii},
  editor={J.-A. Meyer and A. Berthoz and D. Floreano and H. Roitblat and S. Wilson},
  publisher={MIT Press},
  booktitle={SAB00},
  url={http://www.isrl.uiuc.edu/~amag/langev/paper/noble00talkIs.html}
}

 HOME   ::  Conference List   ::   Conference Paper Comments to: junwang4 you-know-at gmail.com Last update: 2/2/08