Seth Bullock - 1997 - An Exploration of Signalling Behaviour by both Analytic and Simulation Means for both Discrete and Continuous Models

Bullock, S. (1997) An Exploration of Signalling Behaviour by both Analytic and Simulation Means for both Discrete and Continuous Models. In Husbands, P. and Harvey, I., editors, ECAL97. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press..

Bookmark:

Full-text
   URL: http://www.inet.gda.pl/ai/ftp.cogs.susx....97/online/F100.ps.gz

   Cached: PDF-591K    PS-791K    PS.gz-253K

   SAVE AS an easy-to-recall long filename:

      Filename format: author--year--title   PDF-591K    PS-253K    :: About GZip'd PS

      Filename format: author--year--title--journal|proceedings|...--pages   PDF-591K    PS-253K

Related links

   CiteSeer: http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/bullock97exploration.html

  Web search: Google Web Search :: Google Scholar

  Within this site: Cited by (11)    References (13)

Paper at a Glance

An exploration of signalling behaviour by both analytic and simulation
means for both discrete and continuous models
Seth Bullock
Evolutionary and Adaptive Systems
School of Cognitive and Computing Sciences
University of Sussex, Brighton BN1 9QH
Abstract Hurd's (1995) model of a discrete action response game, in which the interests of sig nallers and receivers conflict, is extended to ad dress games in which, as well as signal cost vary ing with signaller quality, the value of an ob server's response to a signal is also dependent on signaller quality. It is shown analytically that nonhandicap signalling equilibria exist for such a model. Using a distributed Genetic Algorithm (GA) to simulate the evolution of the model over time, the model's sensitivity to initial conditions is ex plored, and an investigation into the attainability of the analytically derived Evolutionarily Stable Strategies (ESSs) is undertaken. It is discovered that the system is capable of attaining signalling equilibria in addition to those derived via analytic techniques, and that these additional equilibria are consistent with the definition of conventional signalling. Grafen's (1990) proof of Zahavi's handicap prin ciple is generalised in an analogous manner, and it is demonstrated analytically that nonhandicap signalling equilibria also exist for this continuous model of honest signalling.
1 Introduction In the wake of the fall of group selectionist thought dur ing the midsixties, theoretical biologists were left with many problems which had previously been comfortably dealt with through some appeal to the worth of be haviours at a group level. The existence of stable sig nalling systems was one such problem. Although it was feared that the selfish actions of individuals might com promise the stability of natural signalling systems, such systems appeared to be the frequent products of evolu tion. In the midseventies Zahavi (1975, 1977) proposed that the stability of such ...

BibTex

@inproceedings{bullock97anExploration,
  author={Seth Bullock},
  title={An Exploration of Signalling Behaviour by both Analytic and Simulation Means for both Discrete and Continuous Models},
  year={1997},
  address={Cambridge, MA},
  editor={Husbands, P. and Harvey, I.},
  publisher={MIT Press.},
  booktitle={ECAL97},
  url={http://www.isrl.uiuc.edu/~amag/langev/paper/bullock97anExploration.html}
}

HOME :: Conference List :: Conference Paper Comments to: junwang4 you-know-at gmail.com Last update: 2/2/08


HOME :: Conference List :: Conference Paper	Comments to: junwang4 you-know-at gmail.com	Last update: 2/2/08