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Authoritative: http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.1993.1031   (Publisher's PDF... likely be available here.)

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Abstract

This paper identifies evolutionarily stable outcomes in games in which one player has private information and the other takes a payoff-relevant action. The informed player can communicate at little cost. Outcomes satisfying a set-valued evolutionary stability condition must exist and be efficient in common-interest games. When there is a small cost associated with using each message the outcome preferred by the informed player is stable. The paper introduces a nonequilibrium, set-valued stability notion of entry resistant sets. For games with partial common interest, the no-communication outcome is never an element of an entry resistant set.

@article{blume93evolutionaryStability,
  author={Andreas Blume and Yong-Gwan Kim and Joel Sobel},
  title={Evolutionary stability in games of communication},
  journal={Games and Economic Behavior},
  year={1993},
  volume={5},
  number={4},
  pages={547-575},
  doi={10.1006/game.1993.1031},
  url={http://www.isrl.uiuc.edu/~amag/langev/paper/blume93evolutionaryStability.html}
}