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Abstract

While it is of clear benefit for the members of a population to be able to make use of information made available by others, it is not as obvious that any benefit accrues to the sender of informative signals. If the sender of information receives no benefit from so doing, a good strategy would be to exploit the informative signals of others, while sending few useful signals. There is therefore a puzzle as to how coordinated signaling systems could have evolved in the absence of benefit to the information sender. These considerations are explored in a formal model of the evolution of populations of animals that possess signaling systems they inherit from their parents. In the model, an individual's reproductive fitness depends only its ability to correctly interpret the signals of others. No maximally coordinated or stable system will emerge under such conditions. However if there is a relatively small number (less than about 10) of distinct sigals to be sent, populations can reach dynamic equilibria in which a significant fraction of the signals are correctly interpreted.

@unpublished{batali95smallSignaling,
  author={J. Batali},
  title={Small Signaling Systems can Evolve in the Absence of Benefit to the Information Sender},
  year={1995},
  note={Submitted to Artificial Life},
  url={http://www.isrl.uiuc.edu/~amag/langev/paper/batali95smallSignaling.html}
}

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